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Introduction
James Kisor is a Vietnam War veteran who served on active duty
in the Marine Corps from 1962 to 1966. 1 During his years of service,
Mr. Kisor experienced several contacts with snipers, occasional mortar
rounds, and enemy attacks while on search operations. 2 As a result of
the trauma of combat, Mr. Kisor suffers from post-traumatic stress
disorder (“PTSD”), as do eleven percent of male Vietnam War veter–
ans. 3 Although PTSD’s symptoms have been described under different
names for hundreds of years, Mr. Kisor and his fellow Vietnam veterans
were the first American veterans to be diagnosed with this condition. 4
But despite returning home from Vietnam in 1966, Mr. Kisor’s PTSD
did not qualify him for disability benefits through the Department of
1.

Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360, 1361 (2017), vacated sub nom. Kisor v.
Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).

2.

Id.

3.

PTSD and Vietnam Veterans: A Lasting Issue 40 Years Later, U.S.
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs: Agent Orange Newsletter (Summer
2015), https://www.publichealth.va.gov/exposures/publications/agentorange/agent-orange-summer-2015/nvvls.asp [https://perma.cc/63AF-SJ6K]
(last updated June 22, 2016). Seven percent of female Vietnam War
veterans likewise suffer from PTSD. Id.

4.

Id.

217

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 1·2019
A New Auer

Veterans Affairs until 2007, more than forty years after he returned
from the war. 5
As much as Mr. Kisor’s story tells of the challenges that veterans
face when attempting to secure benefits for PTSD and other
psychological conditions, his story also brought to the Supreme Court
of the United States a long-awaited challenge to the Court’s increas–
ingly deferential treatment of administrative decisions. Specifically, Mr.
Kisor’s story gave rise to the appropriate context in which the Court
could definitively affirm or overrule the long-standing judicial-deference
rule under which courts must defer to an agency’s interpretation of the
agency’s own ambiguous regulation unless the interpretation is “plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” 6—also known as
Seminole Rock or Auer deference. 7 The Supreme Court took up Mr.
Kisor’s challenge to this rule in Kisor v. Wilkie 8 after the Federal
Circuit applied the deference rule in a way that denied Mr. Kisor the
earliest possible effective date for his PTSD-related disability benefits. 9
The extent to which courts defer to agency interpretations of their
own regulations bears on our daily lives more than one might expect.
Regulations often have a more direct role in defining our legal rights
than statutes passed by Congress. 10 Take Mr. Kisor for instance. An
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation, not a Congressional act,
was the dispositive factor in determining whether he was entitled to
disability benefits for his PTSD.
The beginning of the twentieth century brought into being the
current order of administrative law, known as the “appellate review
model.” 11 Under the appellate review model, federal courts review an
agency’s decisions as an appellate court would review a trial court’s
decisions. 12 By 1945, it was a “‘common sense’ idea” that an agency
occupied a superior position, compared to a court, to determine what
5.

Kisor v. McDonald, No. 14-2811, 2016 WL 337517, at *1 (Vet. App., Jan.
27, 2016).

6.

Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).

7.

See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019).

8.

Id.

9.

See generally Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017), vacated
sub nom. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (finding no error in the Board’s
interpretation of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1)).

10.

John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 614–15
(1996).

11.

Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of
the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 Colum. L. Rev.
939, 965 (2011).

12.

Id. at 940, 953.
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it meant when it promulgated a rule, and how it could best effectuate
its purposes under a given rule. 13 The Court first expressed that position
in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Co. 14 and confirmed it fifty years later
in Auer v. Robbins. 15
In Seminole Rock, a crushed-stone manufacturer challenged a
regulation promulgated by the Administrator of the Office of Price
Administration under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. 16 The
regulation imposed a wartime “price ‘freeze,’” restricting the price
sellers could charge to the prices that they charged in March 1942. 17
This general regulation was modified by more specific “refinements and
modifications.” 18 One of these refinements was Maximum Price
Regulation No. 188, which covered the crushed stone at issue. 19 The
question before the Court was whether the manufacturer was charging
higher prices for its stone than it did in March 1942. 20 The Court began
its analysis by setting forth the proper standard of review. Because the
Court was reviewing a regulation, it “must necessarily look to the
administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the
words used is in doubt.” 21 The Court then noted that although congre–
ssional intent or constitutional principles may be relevant when
choosing between multiple interpretations, “the ultimate criterion is the
administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” 22 As
a result, a court’s “only tools” in interpreting a regulation “are the plain
words of the regulation and any relevant interpretations of the
[agency].” 23 After determining that the regulation at issue was suscep–
tible to three different interpretations, the Court turned to an agency
bulletin that the Administrator issued to wholesalers and retailers,
which explained how the highest price should be determined. 24 The

13.

Manning, supra note 10, at 614.

14.

325 U.S. 410 (1945).

15.

519 U.S. 452 (1997).

16.

325 U.S. at 411–12.

17.

Id. at 413.

18.

Id.

19.

Id.

20.

Id.

21.

Id. at 413–14.

22.

Id. at 414.

23.

Id.

24.

Id. at 417.
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Court consequently adopted the interpretation most consistent with the
Administration’s guidance. 25
Half a decade later, in Auer v. Robbins, 26 Justice Scalia wrote the
opinion for a unanimous Court re-affirming the rule of Seminole Rock.
The Auer Court deferred to the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of
his own regulations regarding whether employees were entitled to overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). Because
the Secretary interpreted his own regulation, the Court focused its
analysis on whether the interpretation was “plainly erroneous or incon–
sistent with the regulation.” 27 Directly at issue was whether the
employees were paid on a “salary basis” or were considered “‘bona fide
executive, administrative, or professional’ employees” within the
meaning of the regulation. 28 Satisfying these requirements would disen–
title the employees to overtime pay under the FLSA. Under the FLSA
and the Secretary’s regulations, however, employees who were otherwise
paid on a salary basis were still entitled to overtime pay if their
compensation was subject to a reduction based on the quality or
quantity of their work. 29 But pay deductions for disciplinary reasons
was an exception to this exception. The respondent-employees argued
that the Secretary’s application of this disciplinary exception was an
“unreasonable interpretation of the statutory exemption” because
public-sector employees have fewer alternatives for discipline. 30 The
Secretary, on the other hand, argued that employees subject to pay
adjustments for disciplinary reasons “do not deserve exempt status”
because they are not “true ‘executive, administrative, or professional’
employees.” 31 According to the Secretary, true executive, admin–
istrative, and professional employees are not disciplined by “piecemeal
deductions” in pay. 32
The Court began its analysis by first citing to Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 33 in which the Court
had recently held that courts must defer to an agency’s permissible

25.

Id. at 418–19.

26.

519 U.S. 452 (1997).

27.

Id. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).

28.

Id. at 455.

29.

Id. at 456.

30.

Id. at 457.

31.

Id. at 456.

32.

Id.

33.

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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interpretation of an ambiguous statute. 34 Specifically, the Court stated,
“[b]ecause Congress has not ‘directly spoken to the precise question at
issue,’ we must sustain the Secretary’s approach so long as it is ‘based
on a permissible construction of the statute.’” 35 Although the
respondent-employees advanced an interpretation different from that of
the Secretary, the Court concluded that the language of the regulation
did not compel the respondent-employees’ interpretation. 36 The Court
deferred to the Secretary’s interpretation because the salary-basis test
was “a creature of the Secretary’s own regulations,” and consequently,
the Secretary’s interpretation was “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the regulation.’” 37 The Secretary’s interpretation
“easily met” the “plainly erroneous” standard because the regulation
comfortably bore the meaning the Secretary assigned to it. 38
The respondent-employees made one last attempt to strike down
the Secretary’s interpretation, arguing that it was not subject to
deference because it was advanced in a legal brief. 39 The Court swiftly
rejected this argument, however, emphasizing that “[t]he Secretary’s
interpretation is in no sense a ‘post hoc rationalizatio[n]’ advanced by
an agency seeking to defend past agency action against attack.” 40 There
was “no reason to suspect that the interpretation [did] not reflect the
agency’s fair and considered judgment.” 41 And lastly, the Court rejected
the respondents’ argument that the Secretary’s regulation should be
construed narrowly against the employer. According to the Court, that
rule of construction governed only judicial interpretations of statutes
and regulations, and should not be applied as a “limitation on the
Secretary’s power to resolve ambiguities in his own regulations.” 42
Because the Secretary is subject only to the limits prescribed by statute,
he can write regulations “as broadly as he wishes,” and “[a] rule
requiring the Secretary to construe his own regulations narrowly would
make little sense.” 43
34.

Auer, 519 U.S. at 457.

35.

Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43).

36.

Id. at 457–58.

37.

Id. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S.
332, 359 (1989)).

38.

Id.

39.

Id. at 462.

40.

Id. (first alteration added) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.,
488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988)).

41.

Id.

42.

Id. at 463.

43.

Id.
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After delivering the unanimous Auer opinion, however, Scalia
himself sought to limit the breadth of discretion this rule granted to
agencies. 44 And over the coming years, the criticisms continued to
accumulate, pushing against the increased discretion agencies gained
under federal courts’ application of Auer. 45 Indeed, legislators, commen–
tators, and Supreme Court justices have mounted a number of challen–
ges to Auer deference. 46 One of those challenges is that the doctrine
creates the opportunity for agencies to expand their own authority by
intentionally promulgating ambiguous regulations, granting themselves
greater leeway in the permissible range of meanings the language of the
regulation can bear. 47 Others suggest that deferring to an agency’s
interpretation that it advances for the first time during litigation
implicates due-process concerns because litigants do not have a fair
warning of the agency’s position. 48 And even still, some argue that Auer
permits agencies to both create and interpret the law, implicating
separation-of-power principles. 49
44.

See Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 (2011) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (expressing interest in revisiting Auer).

45.

Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court 2016 Term: Foreword: 1930s
Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 24–
26 (2017); see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2446–47 (2019)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[T]he explosive growth of the administrative
state over the last half-century has exacerbated Auer’s potential for
mischief.”); Paul J. Larkin Jr. and Elizabeth H. Slattery, The World After
Seminole Rock and Auer, 42 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 625, 629–30
(2019) (noting “considerable pushback” against the administrative state
and the delegation of “law-interpreting power” to administrative
agencies).

46.

See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210–11 (2015)
(Alito, J., concurring) (inviting the opportunity to reconsider Auer’s
underlying precedent because it “may be incorrect”); Decker v. Northwest
Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 615–16 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(noting an interest in reconsidering Auer and Seminole Rock deference in
a future case); Talk Am., Inc., 564 U.S. at 69 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(same); Johnathan H. Adler, Challenging Administrative Power: Auer
Evasions, 16 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 14 (2018) (arguing that Auer
violates separation-of-power principles); Ronald A. Cass, Auer Deference:
Doubling Down on Delegations’ Defects, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 531, 535
(2018) (arguing that Auer deference allows agencies to expand their
authority by promulgating ambiguous regulations).

47.

Cass, supra note 46, at 535–36.

48.

See, e.g., id. at 535; see also Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Polgoriler,
Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1449, 1464 (2011)
(noting that deference to informally adopted interpretive rules allows
“agencies to issue binding legal norms while escaping both procedural
constraints and meaningful judicial scrutiny.”).

49.

See, e.g., Adler, supra note 46, at 14; Cass, supra note 46, at 536;
Manning, supra note 10, at 631–654; see also Jeffrey A. Pojanowski,
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But in June 2019, the Supreme Court addressed these concerns in
Kisor v. Wilkie, choosing to re-affirm Auer while at the same time
purporting to limit its scope. This Comment addresses the Court’s
reformulation of Auer and anticipates its implications for the future of
administrative law. Part I sets forth the facts of Mr. Kisor’s story and
the underlying legal proceedings. Part II addresses the Court’s reform–
ulation of Auer in Kisor v. Wilkie. And Part III analyzes what this
decision means for the future of judicial deference to agencies’
interpretations of regulations. Specifically, Part III argues that although
the Court re-affirmed Auer, its re-formulation of the doctrine may still
lead to the demise of judicial deference to agency interpretations of
regulations.

I.

The Underlying Proceedings

In December of 1982, Mr. Kisor first filed a claim with the
Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Portland, Oregon for
disability compensation benefits for PTSD. 50 Despite receiving a PTSD
diagnosis from a counselor at the local veterans center, the regional
office denied his claim for benefits after an examiner diagnosed Mr.
Kisor with intermittent explosive disorder and atypical personality
disorder rather than PTSD. 51 Mr. Kisor initiated an appeal but failed
to perfect it, and the Regional Office’s decision became final. 52
On June 5, 2006, Mr. Kisor submitted a request to reopen his
previously denied claim for PTSD. This time, an examiner diagnosed
Mr. Kisor with PTSD. 53 While his request was pending, he submitted
new evidence, including a 2007 psychiatric report diagnosing him with
PTSD, a copy of his Department of Defense Form 214, a Combat
History, Expeditions, and Awards Record, and the February 1983 letter
from the Portland regional office. 54 The regional office granted Mr.
Kisor’s compensation for PTSD and assigned a fifty-percent disability
rating, effective as of June 5, 2006, the date he reopened his request. 55
Mr. Kisor filed a notice of disagreement, challenging both the disability
Challenging Administrative Power: Revisiting Seminole Rock, 16 Geo. J.
L. & Pub. Pol’y 87, 90–91 (2018) (noting various criticisms of Auer
deference).
50.

Kisor v. McDonald, No. 14-2811, 2016 WL 337517, at *1 (Vet. App., Jan.
27, 2016).

51.

Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2017), vacated sub
nom. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).

52.

Id. at 1362.

53.

Id.

54.

Id.

55.

Id.
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rating and its effective date. 56 While he was successful at increasing his
disability rating to seventy percent, the regional office refused to
designate an earlier effective date. 57 Mr. Kisor then appealed to the
Board of Veterans’ Appeals (the “Board”), arguing that he was entitled
to an effective date that was the same as the date of his initial claim
that was denied in May 1983. 58 Mr. Kisor also argued that the new
evidence he provided demonstrated that the 1983 decision was the
result of clear and unmistakable error. 59 The Board rejected Mr. Kisor’s
arguments on the basis that the 1983 decision was rendered final when
he failed to perfect his appeal. 60 The Board also held that the new
evidence did not demonstrate clear and unmistakable error. 61
Mr. Kisor then appealed the Board’s decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. 62 Mr. Kisor argued that the
Board misapplied 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) when considering whether his
new evidence demonstrated clear and unmistakable error in the 1983
decision. 63 This regulation governs the ability of a veteran to “reopen a
finally adjudicated claim by submitting new and material evidence.” 64
Mr. Kisor sought to reopen his initial claim by submitting service
department records in accordance with § 3.156(c), the regulation’s
subdivision addressing service department records. 65 Section 3.156(c)
provides that the Department of Veterans Affairs may reconsider a
previously adjudicated claim upon the receipt of “relevant official
service department records that existed and had not been associated
with the claims file when VA first decided the claim.” 66 Generally, when
a previously denied claim is reopened and granted based on new
evidence, the effective date of the benefits will be either the date the
claimant filed the application to reopen the claim or the date the
entitlement arose, whichever is later. 67 But when a previously denied
claim is reopened and granted based on newly discovered service
56.

Id.

57.

Id. at 1362–63.

58.

Id. at 1363.

59.

Id.

60.

Id.

61.

Kisor v. McDonald, No. 14-2811, 2016 WL 337517, at *1 (Vet. App., Jan.
27, 2016).

62.

See generally id.

63.

Id. at *1.

64.

38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (2019).

65.

Kisor, 2016 WL 337517, at *3; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) (2019).

66.

38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1) (2019).

67.

Kisor, 2016 WL 337517, at *2.
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department records, the effective date may be as early as the date of
the original claim. 68 Mr. Kisor believed he was entitled to the 1982
effective date because his new evidence constituted newly discovered
service records. 69
Even though Mr. Kisor submitted new service department records,
the Board did not apply § 3.156(c) because it determined that the new
records were not relevant within the meaning of the regulation. 70
According to the Board’s position, the service department records could
be relevant only if they “would suggest or better yet establish that [Mr.
Kisor] has PTSD as a current disability.” 71 Because the new service
records established only that Mr. Kisor experienced a traumatic event
during service and did not establish that he had PTSD, the “documents
were not outcome determinative in that they [did] not manifestly
change [the] outcome of the decision.” 72 The crux of the 1983 decision
was whether Mr. Kisor warranted a diagnosis of PTSD, not whether he
engaged in combat during service. 73 As a result, the court affirmed the
Board’s decision. 74
Mr. Kisor then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, arguing that the Veterans Court misinterpreted the term
“relevant” in § 3.156(c)(1). 75 The court began its analysis by identifying
the grounds upon which it may “set aside an interpretation of a
regulation”: when the interpretation is “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B)
contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or in violation
of a statutory right; or (D) without observance of procedure required
by law.” 76
The court first considered Mr. Kisor’s interpretation. Mr. Kisor
argued that to be relevant under the regulation, a service department
record need only have “any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable

68.

Id.

69.

Id.

70.

Id.

71.

Id.

72.

Id.

73.

Id.

74.

Id. at *3.

75.

Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017), vacated sub nom.
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).

76.

Id. (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1)(A)–(D) (2012); Sursely v. Peake, 551
F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
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or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” 77 According to
Mr. Kisor’s position, his service department records were relevant
because they demonstrated that he experienced “the trauma of combat”
and was exposed “to an in-service stressor.” 78 The government, on the
other hand, maintained that the Board and the Veterans Court inter–
preted the regulation correctly. According to the government, whether
a service department record is relevant under the regulation “depends
upon the particular claim and the other evidence of record.” 79 The
government further proffered that “if a record is one that the VA had
no obligation to consider because it would not have mattered in light
of the other evidence, then it cannot trigger reconsideration.” 80 Even
more, the government insisted that whether Mr. Kisor experienced an
in-service stressor was not at issue in the 1983 decision; rather, the basis
for the denial was that he did not have a diagnosis of PTSD. 81
The Federal Circuit ultimately affirmed the Veterans Court’s
decision, holding that it did not misinterpret the regulation. 82 The court
justified its conclusion with a string of cases espousing the rule of Auer
deference. Specifically, the court stated, “[a]s a general rule, we defer to
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation ‘as long as the reg–
ulation is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is neither plainly
erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation.’” 83 In applying this rule,
the court first concluded that the regulation was ambiguous because
“the regulation is vague as to the scope of the word, and canons of
construction do not reveal its meaning.” 84 The court also noted that
“[t]he varying, alternative definitions of the word ‘relevant’ offered by
the parties further underscore[d] [the regulation’s] ambiguity.” 85 After
finding the regulation ambiguous, the court’s “only remaining question”
was whether the Board’s interpretation was “‘plainly erroneous or
inconsistent’ with the VA’s regulatory framework.” 86 On this point, the
court briefly asserted that “[t]he Board’s interpretation does not strike
77.

Id. at 1366 (quoting Claimant-Appellant’s Brief at 9–10, Kisor, 869 F.3d
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1929)).

78.

Id.

79.

Id.

80.

Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent-Appellee at 15, Kisor, 869 F.3d 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1929)).

81.

Id.

82.

Id. at 1367.

83.

Id. (quoting Gose v. U.S. Postal Serv., 451 F.3d 831, 836 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).

84.

Id.

85.

Id.

86.

Id. at 1368 (quoting Long Island Care at Home v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171
(2007)).
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us as either plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the VA’s regulatory
framework.” 87 But Mr. Kisor’s interpretation, on the other hand, was
not probative as to the issue of whether he had a PTSD diagnosis in
1982, and as such, the court saw “no plain error in the Board’s con–
clusion that the records were not ‘relevant’ for the purposes of
§ 3.156(c)(1).” 88 Because it saw “no error” in the Board’s interpretation,
the court affirmed. 89
Mr. Kisor petitioned for a panel rehearing and a rehearing en banc,
both of which the Federal Circuit denied. 90 Three Federal Circuit judges
dissented, however, taking issue with the fact that the court resolved
the case based on Auer “despite the Supreme Court’s repeated reminder
that statutes concerning veterans are to be construed liberally in favor
of the veteran.” 91 Admitting that the Federal Circuit was in no position
to overrule Auer, the dissent insisted that where Auer conflicts with a
substantive canon of construction, such as the one in Mr. Kisor’s case,
Auer must give way. 92 Concluding that “[g]ranting Auer deference to
VA regulations conflicts directly with the moral principles underlying
the veterans benefit system,” the dissent suggested that were it not for
Auer, the regulation’s ambiguity would have been resolved in Mr.
Kisor’s favor. 93
Mr. Kisor then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on June 29,
2018, asking the Supreme Court to overturn Auer and Seminole Rock,
or alternatively, to hold that Auer deference should yield to a
substantive canon of construction. 94 Mr. Kisor contended that his case
presented the appropriate vehicle for the Court to review Auer
deference because the Federal Circuit’s application of Auer was
outcome-determinative in his case. 95 He further posited that criticisms
of Auer coming from current Supreme Court justices, as well as several
Supreme Court decisions narrowing Auer’s scope, had led to substantial
confusion in the lower courts, and that the Court should decide, once
and for all, if courts must defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own

87.

Id.

88.

Id.

89.

Id. at 1369.

90.

Kisor v. Shulkin, 880 F.3d 1378, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

91.

Id. at 1379 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).

92.

Id.

93.

Id. at 1382.

94.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400
(2019) (No. 18-15).

95.

Id. at 3.
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regulation. 96 After all, as Mr. Kisor admitted, the rule is important 97:
with the administrative state “touch[ing] almost every aspect of daily
life,” 98 “[t]he growth of the administrative state has compounded Auer’s
practical implications.” 99
Mr. Kisor further distinguished his case from other previous
petitions challenging Auer. For one thing, the outcome of his case
depended entirely on the Federal Circuit’s application of Auer. 100 For
another, the Department of Veterans Affairs was actually a party to
the litigation, directly implicating the criticism that an agency should
not be able to invoke Auer to resolve a dispute in its own favor. 101 No
recent policy decisions had rendered the underlying issue moot, and Mr.
Kisor posited that he was substantially likely to prevail on remand
should the Federal Circuit apply a de novo standard of review. 102
Finding Mr. Kisor’s petition compelling, the Court granted review as
to Mr. Kisor’s first question: whether the Court should overturn
Auer. 103

II. The New Auer
Although not convinced by Mr. Kisor’s calls to abandon the
doctrine entirely, the Court vacated and remanded the Federal Circuit’s
decision to be reconsidered under a newly clarified and limited Auer.
While unanimous in the judgment, the Court was far from unified on
its underlying rationale. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the
Court, which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined in full. 104
Chief Justice Roberts concurred in part. 105 Justice Gorsuch concurred
in the judgment only, challenging every element of Kagan’s analysis. 106
Justice Thomas joined Gorsuch’s concurrence in full; Justices Kavan–
augh and Alito joined Gorsuch’s concurrence in part. 107 And even still,
96.

Id. at 10–14.

97.

Id. at 13.

98.

Id. at 14 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight
Bd., 462 U.S. 477, 499 (2010)).

99.

Id. at 13.

100. Id. at 19.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 20.
103. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 657 (2018).
104. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2407 (2019).
105. Id. at 2424 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
106. See id. at 2425–48 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 2425.
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Kavanaugh wrote his own opinion concurring in the judgment, which
Alito joined. 108
Justice Kagan’s opinion proceeds in four main parts, including a
Part I, Part II-A, Part II-B, Part III-A, Part III-B, and Part IV. 109 Only
Parts I, II-B, III-B, and IV had a majority vote, and thus, the remaining
parts may not properly be considered the opinion of the Court. 110 Not
surprisingly, the Parts receiving the majority vote are the least
contentious. 111 In response, Gorsuch devoted twenty-three pages to
challenging Auer on multiple grounds, including arguing that it violates
the Administrative Procedure Act and separation-of-power principles. 112
He also argued that the Court did not in fact adhere to the doctrine of
stare decisis in the way it “reshap[ed]” Auer in “new and experimental
ways.” 113 Because the competing arguments for and against overturning
Auer deference are outside the scope of this Comment, the following
subsections address only those portions of the opinion that set forth the
new limits imposed on Auer deference.
A.

The Opinion of the Court

The Court’s recitation of Mr. Kisor’s case does not differ materially
from how it was summarized above. 114 Indeed, the particular facts of
Mr. Kisor’s story have little, if any, bearing on the way in which the
Court formed its articulation of Auer. Part II-B of the Court’s opinion,
however, provides specific directions for how courts should apply Auer
going forward. 115 In fact, within two months of the Court issuing its
opinion, lower courts had already cited to Part II-B in at least fifteen
cases. 116 Ultimately, a majority of five justices agreed that Auer’s scope
108. Id. at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 2407 (majority opinion).
110. Id.
111. Part I merely recites the facts and procedural history of Mr. Kisor’s case.
Id. at 2408–10. Part II-B sets forth limitations on Auer’s scope and appli–
cation. Id. at 2414–18. Part III-B applies the doctrine of stare decisis,
under which the Court prefers to adhere to precedent in the absence of a
special justification. Id. at 2422–23. And Part IV concludes that the
Federal Circuit failed to properly apply Auer, and thus its decision should
be vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Court’s
opinion. Id. at 2423–24. Parts II-A and III-A, on the other hand, frame
Auer deference as a principle of legislative intent and argue that Auer was
properly decided in the first place. See id. at 2410–14, 2418–22.
112. See id. at 2425–48 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 2443–44.
114. See id. at 2408–09 (majority opinion).
115. See id. at 2414–18.
116. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 694 (9th Cir. 2019);
Winding Creek Solar LLC v. Peterman, 932 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2019);
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required limitation. Justice Kagan implemented those limitations by
articulating Auer as a three-step process. First, courts must determine
whether the regulation is “genuinely ambiguous” by “exhaust[ing] all
the ‘traditional tools’ of construction.” 117 Kagan encouraged courts to
tackle the “hard interpretive conundrums” of complex rules, and to
cease only when the “legal toolkit is empty.” 118 She instructed courts to
“‘carefully consider[ ]’ the text, structure, history, and purpose of a
regulation, in all the ways [they] would if [they] had no agency to fall
back on.” 119 If courts try this hard, she suggested, they may “resolve
many seeming ambiguities” without resorting to Auer deference. 120
Second, if a court concludes that the regulation is “genuinely
ambiguous,” it must determine whether the agency’s interpretation falls
within “the zone of ambiguity the court has identified after employing
all its interpretive tools.” 121 The court’s previous ambiguity inquiry
should guide its analysis under this second step in that “[t]he text,
structure, history, and so forth . . . establish the outer bounds of
permissible interpretation.” 122
And under the third step, Kagan emphasizes that not all agency
interpretations surviving to this point should receive Auer deference.
Laturner v. United States, 933 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Howell
v. Advantage RN, LLC, No. 17-CV-883 JLS (BLM), 2019 WL 3858896,
at *8 (S.D. Ca. Aug. 16, 2019); Belt v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc.,
No. 18-3831, 2019 WL 3829459, at *11–13, *15–16 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15,
2019); United States v. Brace, No. 1:17-cv-00006 (BR), 2019 WL 3778394,
at *20–21 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2019); Mayo Clinic v. United States, No.
16-cv-03113 (ECT/KMM), 2019 WL 3574709, at *4 (Dist. Minn. Aug. 6,
2019); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
Nos. CV-17-00475-TUC-JAS (L), CV-17-00576-TUC-JAS (C), CV-1800189-TUC-JAS (C), 2019 WL 3503330, at *9 (Dist. Ariz. July 31, 2019);
East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922, 939 (N.D.
Ca. 2019); Braeburn Inc. v. United States FDA, 389 F. Supp. 3d 1, 19–
20, 23 (Dist. D.C. 2019); Trawler Carolina Lady, Inc. v. Ross, No. 4:19CV-19-FL, 2019 WL 3213537, at *13 (E.D.N.C. July 16, 2019); Sagarwala
v. Cissna, 387 F. Supp. 3d. 56, 67 (Dist. D.C. 2019); Hyland v. Navient
Corp., No. 18cv9031(DLC), 2019 WL 2918238, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 8,
2019); Spencer v. Macado’s, Inc., No. 6:18-cv-00005, 2019 WL 2931304,
at *5–6 (W.D. Va. July 8, 2019); May v. Azar, Nos. 2180004, 2180033,
2019 WL 3521136, at *11 (Ala. App. Aug. 2, 2019); E. Or. Mining Ass’n
v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 365 Or. 313, 347, 352–53, 363–66 (Or. 2019).
117. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)).
118. Id.
119. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc.,
501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2415–16.
122. Id. at 2416.
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Rather, “a court must make an independent inquiry into whether the
character and context of the agency interpretation entitles it to
controlling weight.” 123 Declining to set forth an exhaustive test for when
deference is appropriate, the Court provides three “markers” for
identifying when an agency’s permissible interpretation of a genuinely
ambiguous regulation warrants deference. First, the interpretation must
represent the agency’s “authoritative” or “official” position rather than
an “ad hoc statement not reflecting the agency’s views.” 124 The Court
clarifies, though, that the interpretation must not necessarily flow
directly from the Secretary or his or her chief advisors; rather, it “must
at least emanate from those actors, using those vehicles, understood to
make authoritative policy in the relevant context.” 125 Examples of
interpretations failing this requirement include a speech by a mid-level
official, an informal memorandum recounting a conversation, or
regulatory guides that an agency has directly rejected as
authoritative. 126 Second, the interpretation must implicate the agency’s
expertise. 127 This marker is based on the assumption that agencies have
a more “nuanced understanding of the regulations they administer.” 128
And if an agency “has no comparative expertise in resolving a
regulatory ambiguity, Congress presumably would not grant it that
authority.” 129 And third, the agency’s interpretation must reflect “fair
and considered judgment.” 130 Thus, “convenient litigating position[s]”
and “post hoc rationalizatio[ns]” are not entitled to deference under
Auer. 131 Additionally, Auer deference is not warranted when the agency
advances a new interpretation that would create “unfair surprise” to
affected parties. 132
In sum, an agency interpretation deserves Auer deference when (1)
it is genuinely ambiguous; (2) it falls within the “zone of ambiguity”;
and (3) the interpretation reflects the agency’s fair and considered
judgment. With this new formulation in mind, the Court determined
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 257 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
125. Id. at 2417.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155
(2012).
131. Id. (quoting Christopher, 567 U.S. at 155).
132. Id. at 2417–18 (quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S.
158, 170 (2006).
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that the doctrine of stare decisis “cuts strongly against” overturning
Auer and its “long line of precedents.” 133 It was not enough that “[t]he
administrative state has evolved substantially since 1945,” as Mr. Kisor
argued. 134 And consequently, the most the Court was willing to do, as
Kagan put it, was “reinforce the limits of Auer.” 135
Finally, the Court applied the newly limited Auer to Mr. Kisor’s
case, holding that the Federal Circuit must reconsider its application of
Auer in light of the Court’s opinion. 136 Not only did the Federal Circuit
fail to exhaust every interpretive tool in finding the regulation ambig–
uous, it did not determine whether the agency’s interpretation was of
the kind that Congress intended courts to defer to. 137 On remand, the
Federal Circuit is to “make a conscientious effort to determine,” based
on the regulation’s “text, structure, history, and purpose,” whether it
truly “has more than one reasonable meaning.” 138 If it does, the court
must then determine whether the Board of Veterans’ Appeals’ inter–
pretation “reflects the considered judgment of the agency as a whole.” 139
Only then will Mr. Kisor have a final determination as to the effective
date of his disability benefits.
B.

Gorsuch’s Concurrence

According to Justice Gorsuch, “[i]t should have been easy for the
Court to say goodbye to Auer v. Robbins.” 140 In his view, the Court
created a new “zombified” version of Auer deference when it should
have overruled the doctrine altogether. 141 He disputed that stare decisis
should apply to Auer at all because Auer “prescribe[s] an interpretive
methodology governing every future dispute over the meaning of every
regulation.” 142 He then pointed out that the majority does not even
retain Auer in its original form, but instead rejects the lower court’s
faithful application of the doctrine. 143 To Gorsuch, the majority’s
“refinement” of Auer fails to gives lower courts a more “workable
133. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2422 (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. 782,
798 (2014)).
134. Id. at 2423.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2424.
137. Id. at 2423–24.
138. Id. at 2424.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2444.
143. Id. at 2445.
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standard.” 144 He attacked the “newly mandated inquiry into the
‘character and context of the agency interpretation’” as “destined only
to compound the confusion.” 145 But Gorsuch did identify a “silver
lining” in the majority’s reformulation. The requirement that courts
“exhaust all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction” prior to considering
whether to defer to the agency may absolve lower courts from ever
having to defer under Auer. 146 He further suggested that the lack of
guidance under the final inquiry into the “character and context” of the
interpretation grants courts sufficient leeway to avoid deferring to an
agency interpretation that differs from what the court believes to be
the best interpretation. 147
C.

Roberts’s Concurrence in Part

Chief Justice Roberts joined the majority opinion, but declined to
join Parts II-A and III-A, which discuss Auer’s background and whether
Auer was correctly decided in the first place. 148 Agreeing that Auer
should not be overruled but merely limited, Roberts wrote separately
to “suggest that the distance between the majority and Justice Gorsuch
is not as great as it may initially appear.” 149 He compared the majority’s
limitations on Auer deference—that “the agency’s interpretation must
be reasonable and must reflect its authoritative, expertise-based, and
fair and considered judgment; and the agency must take account of
reliance interests and avoid unfair surprise”—to his proffered reasons
why a court might defer to an agency’s interpretation: that “[t]he
agency thoroughly considered the problem, offered a valid rationale,
brought its expertise to bear, and interpreted the regulation in a manner
consistent with earlier and later pronouncements.” 150 But Roberts was
careful to distinguish Auer deference from deference under Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 151 according to which a court defers to an agency’s
interpretation that lacks the force and effect of law to the extent that
the interpretation is persuasive. 152

144. Id.
145. Id. at 2446.
146. Id. at 2448.
147. Id. at 2446.
148. Id. at 2424 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
152. Id. at 139–40.
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D.

Kavanaugh’s Concurrence

Agreeing with Justice Gorsuch that Auer should be overruled,
Justice Kavanaugh wrote separately to advance two additional points.
Kavanaugh addressed the majority’s insistence that courts employ “all
the ‘traditional tools’ of construction” in determining whether a
regulation is genuinely ambiguous. 153 According to Kavan–augh, courts
“will almost always reach a conclusion about the best interpretation of
the regulation at issue,” and as such, will have no need to defer to the
agency under Auer. 154 Because the only regulations to receive Auer
deference will be those that employ broad terms such as “reasonable”
or “practicable,” the result is a rule that resembles the one espoused in
Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 155 under
which an agency must provide a reasoned analysis when changing a
rule. 156

III. Going Forward
Before determining what Kisor v. Wilkie means for the future of
Auer deference, a brief reminder of how the Court articulated Auer
deference prior to Kisor is necessary. To recap, in Seminole Rock, the
Court held that “the ultimate criterion” for determining the proper
interpretation of an ambiguous regulation “is the administrative inter–
pretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” 157 Then, the Auer Court
held that courts should defer to the agency’s interpretation of the
ambiguous regulation “so long as it is ‘based on a permissible
construction of the statute.’” 158 Thus, the agency’s interpretation of an
ambiguous regulation is binding as long as it is a reasonable
interpretation of the regulation, even if the agency’s interpretation is
not the best or most natural interpretation. 159 Now, after Kisor, courts
should afford Auer deference to an agency’s interpretation of a
“genuinely ambiguous” regulation when the agency’s interpretation
“fall[s] within the bounds of reasonable interpretation” and when “the

153. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
154. Id.
155. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
156. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2448 (Kavanaugh J., concurring); State Farm, 463
U.S. at 42.
157. Bowels v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
158. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
159. See Manning, supra note 10, at 627–28.
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character and context of the agency interpretation entitles it to
controlling weight.” 160
According to empirical studies, when courts apply Auer, they defer
to agencies between seventy-four and ninety-one percent of the time. 161
Deference is likely to become far less frequent as courts have more
opportunities to apply Kisor because fewer agency interpretations will
receive deference under Auer. Each step of the reformulated Auer
analysis provides courts with an opportunity to deny deference to the
agency interpretation. And so Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh may
be correct in their predictions that Kisor may be an end to judicial
deference towards agency interpretations of regulations after all.
First and foremost, not every ambiguous regulation is entitled to
Auer deference, as fewer ambiguous regulations will survive the initial
“genuine ambiguity” inquiry. Indeed, Justice Kagan and the majority
sought to limit Auer’s scope by formulating the initial ambiguity
inquiry as one in search of “genuine ambiguity.” 162 As Justice Kavan–
augh predicts, the new Auer will likely reduce the frequency with which
courts defer to agency interpretations because they will decide on the
“best interpretation” of the regulation after employing all the
traditional tools of construction. 163 Indeed, district courts have already
denied agency interpretations Auer deference on the basis that the
regulation at issue was not genuinely ambiguous. 164 In Laturner v.
United States, 165 the Federal Circuit was tasked with interpreting tax
regulations governing U.S. savings bonds. 166 The Federal Circuit
160. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415–16.
161. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1099 (2008) (analyzing Supreme
Court opinions that apply Auer deference from 1984–2004 and finding
that the Court deferred to the agency 91% of the time); Richard J. Pierce,
Jr. & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 515, 519–20 (2011)
(analyzing 219 district and circuit court cases from 1999–2001 and 2005–
2007 in which the courts applied Auer, finding that courts deferred to the
agency 76% of the time); William Yeatman, An Empirical Defense of
Auer Step Zero, 106 Geo. L.J. 515, 517, 519 (2018) (analyzing circuit
court opinions applying Auer deference from 1993–2013, finding that
courts deferred to the agency 74% of the time).
162. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415.
163. Id. at 2448.
164. See, e.g., Laturner v. United States, 933 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2019);
North Carolina Div. of Servs. for the Blind v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 1:17cv-1058, 2019 WL 3997009, at *13 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2019).
165. 933 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
166. Id. at 1357–58.
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concluded, after using “the ‘traditional tools’ of construction,” that the
regulation was not genuinely ambiguous. 167 The Laturner court relied
mostly on the regulation’s plain language, recognizing that the
Treasury’s proffered interpretation conflicted with exclusions elsewhere
in the regulation. 168 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has already denied
deference to an interpretation of an ambiguous regulation on the basis
that the regulation was not genuinely ambiguous. 169
The initial ambiguity inquiry also now requires the court to
determine whether both competing interpretations are reasonable. As
Kagan posits, there is no reason to defer when there is only one
reasonable construction of the regulation. 170 She instructs courts to
“‘carefully consider[ ]’ the text, structure, history, and purpose of a
regulation, in all the ways it would if it had no agency to fall back
on.” 171 And whether a regulation is clear or ambiguous (or even
genuinely ambiguous) can be entirely subjective depending upon what
the judge determines constitutes “‘enough’ ambiguity.” 172 As Justices
Gorsuch and Kavanaugh predict, a rigorous application of the ambig–
uity inquiry may preclude deference in most circumstances.
Also likely to limit the frequency with which courts defer to
agencies under Auer is the requirement that the interpretation’s “char–
acter and context” entitles it to deference. Because the new Auer leaves
the lower courts with only “markers” for determining when deference is
appropriate, lower courts may take it upon themselves to identify
additional reasons not to defer to an agency’s interpretation. District
courts have already declined to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a
genuinely ambiguous regulation based on the character and context of
the interpretation. 173 For example, in United States Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) v. Byrnes, 174 the district court judge
explained that he could not defer to the CFTC’s new interpretation of
167. Id. at 1362 (quoting Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415).
168. Id. at 1363.
169. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Comm’r, 934 F.3d 976, 992–93 (9th Cir. 2019).
170. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415.
171. Id. (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991)).
172. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L.
Rev. 2118, 2136 (2016) (reviewing Robert A. Katzmann, Judging
Statutes (2014)).
173. See, e.g., United States CFTC v. Byrnes, No. 13-CV-1174 (VSB), 2019
WL 4515209, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2019); Belt v. P.F. Chang’s China
Bistro, Inc., No. 18-3831, 2019 WL 3829459, at *16–17 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15,
2019); Spencer v. Macado’s Inc., No. 6:18-CV-00005, 2019 WL 2931304,
at *6 (W.D. Va. July 8, 2019); Romer v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282, 293–94 (4th
Cir. 2019); Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 693, 700 (9th Cir. 2019).
174. No. 13-CV-1174 (VSB), 2019 WL 4515209.
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a regulation because people in the industry had been relying on the
previous interpretation for over twenty years. 175 In Belt v. P.F. Chang’s
China Bistro, 176 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the
Department of Labor’s interpretation of a genuinely ambiguous
regulation did not warrant deference because the interpretation was
unreasonable and did not reflect the agency’s fair and considered
judgment because the agency reversed a long-standing previous inter–
pretation. 177
And lastly, in granting certiorari to only Mr. Kisor’s first question,
the Court did not address whether another substantive canon of
construction should override Auer deference. 178 This leaves room for the
lower courts to avoid applying Auer deference by employing other
substantive canons of construction to resolve an apparent ambiguity
when exhausting all the traditional tools of construction. Nothing in
the Court’s Kisor opinion appears to prevent the lower courts from
doing so. Justice Kavanaugh alludes to this in his concurrence,
suggesting that the only regulations to receive Auer deference going
forward will be those with broad and inherently ambiguous terms such
as “reasonable” or “practicable.” 179 As such, lower court judges who still
have a fundamental disagreement with Auer deference can avoid
applying the doctrine as much as possible by engaging in a rigorous
application of Justice Kagan’s first step and consulting other substan–
tive canons of construction to resolve ambiguities.

IV. Conclusion
Although the Court declined to abandon the Auer doctrine, Kisor
v. Wilkie may prove a useful tool for judges and litigators to reduce the
frequency with which courts defer to agencies. Indeed, multiple federal
courts have already denied deference to agency interpretations of regul–
ations in the wake of Kisor, even denying Chevron deference to an
agency interpretation of a statute because the statute was not “genuin–
ely ambiguous.” 180 Auer may well be litigated into extinction, bringing
an end to this long-contested, yet long-standing, doctrine.

175. Id. at *6.
176. No. 18-3831, 2019 WL 3829459.
177. Id. at *15.
178. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400
(2019) (No. 18-15).
179. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2448–49 (Kavanaugh J., concurring).
180. See Mayo Clinic v. United States, No. 16-CV-03113, 2019 WL 3574709,
at *9, *12 (D. Minn. Aug. 6, 2019) (denying Chevron deference because
the statute was not genuinely ambiguous).
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